ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF ANTICOMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS IN ALGORITHMIC PRICING
Keywords:
algorithmic pricing, anticompetitive agreements, cartel, concerted practices, hub-and-spoke, artificial intelligence, digital economy, antitrust law, competition law of UzbekistanAbstract
The article examines theoretical and applied problems of antitrust qualification of anticompetitive agreements arising under conditions of algorithmic pricing. The author analyses the principal typologies of algorithmic coordination (hub-and-spoke, parallel algorithms, predictable agent, autonomous machine learning), considers doctrinal approaches to establishing the existence of an agreement and concerted practices, and compares enforcement practice in the United States, the European Union, and the Republic of Uzbekistan. Based on comparative legal analysis, the author formulates proposals for improving national competition legislation, including the introduction of presumptions and expansion of the scope of liable subjects in cases involving pricing algorithms.
References
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