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FEAR AND EDUCATION

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Annotation. This paper is not about using fear as an educational tool. Rather it explains the existence of collective obedience in societies and clarifies the reasons behind this obedience along with political unrest, chaos happening here and there throughout history up until now. Leading further, author elucidates that compliance either occurs out of fear of punishment or willingly, for societies have been educated or programmed to do so.

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ҚЎРҚУВ ВА ТАҲСИЛ

Аннотация. Мазкур мақола қўрқувни таълим воситаси сифатида ишлатиш ҳақида эмас. Аксинча, бу мақола жамиятларда қандай қилиб коллектив итоаткорлик вужудга келишини тушунтиради. Бутун тарих давомида ва ҳозирги кунгача юз берган тартибсизлик, хаос ва сиёсий нотинчликлар билан бир қаторда ушбу итоаткорликнинг сабабларини аниқлашга ҳаракат қилади. Муаллиф тушунтиришича, розилик қўрқув жазосига боғлиқ ёки ихтиёрий равишда вужудга келади, чунки жамият бунга одатланган ёки шу тартибда дастурлаштирилган.

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СТРАХ И ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ

Аннотация. Данная статья не об использовании страха в качестве образовательного инструмента. Скорее, в ней объясняется существование коллективного повиновения в обществах. Проясняется причины этого повиновения наряду с политическими волнениями, хаосом, происходящим повсюду на протяжении всей истории вплоть до настоящего времени. Далее автор разъясняет, что согласие происходит либо из-за наказания страха, либо добровольно, поскольку общество приучено или запрограммировано на это.

*“It is much safer to be feared than loved “
(Niccolo Machiavelli , The Prince)*

Introduction. In his book, David Easton proposed to apply general systems theory to politics offering a different vision, which serves to explain why there must be a certain dialogue between the governing bodies and the governed subject, that is, the population. Here the scientist argues that citizens or subjects should indirectly participate in the decision-making process by being familiar with new laws or policies made by the state. Otherwise, the gap between the two parties can generate distortions in social coexistence and make it less peaceful.

Machiavelli and *the Prince*. It is necessary to go back to Machiavelli to understand the role of the ruler. Although five centuries have passed since he wrote this work, his views remain topical. In his chapter XVII, Machiavelli says: "Upon this, a question arises: whether it is better to be loved rather than feared or feared rather than loved? It might perhaps be answered that one should wish to be both, but since it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is far safer to be feared than loved".

According to this statement, the ruler is concerned about the reaction of its population. 500 years ago, the concern of the ruler was not whether his policies would be welcomed, or with an eye at the next election; he looked at further, knowing that his position was for life. For this reason, the Florentine author refers rather to how the relationship between the ruler and the ruled will be, which in principle was going to be about 20 or 30 years (depending on the life expectancy of that time). Although the prince did not submit to the typical accountability of democratic systems and did not have to undergo an examination every four years, he was interested in maintaining a cordial relationship with his people to avoid turmoil, altercations, tumults, rebellions, or revolts, and maintain social peace, a good atmosphere of harmony. In addition to this, in the Florence of the s. XVI, the rulers feared God and knew well the Divine Law, which marked a series of limits to their power: he knew that he was not going to live forever and that, sooner or later, he was going to die and appear before the High Judge of alive and dead.

According to Machiavelli, the ideal would be for the ruler to be both feared and loved, but since it is difficult to have both simultaneously in the same person, he had to choose; and, according to him, it is better for the ruler should be feared by the population than to be loved by them. The Machiavelli quote goes on to say:

And that prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment which never fails [1] .

The main reason that Machiavelli gives, as seen in the text, is that human beings are very forgetful and soon forget all the good things rulers made for them. However, it is difficult for us to forget the evil that they caused us. So either out of fear of being harmed again or out of resentment against the person who inflicts harm on us, this is not so easily forgotten and accompanies us as a permanent reminder that it is necessary to obey if we do not want to suffer again.

Chingiz Aitmatov wrote a novel titled "The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years", where he attacked Stalin's legacy. Aitmatov tells an anecdote where it is evident that Stalin was rude and ruthless. In any case, it seems that the following story is a legend and not an accurate part of World Contemporary History:

Stalin called together his closest comrades-in-arms. "I understand you are wondering how I govern the people so that every last one of them... thinks of me as a living god. Now I will teach you the right attitude toward the people. "And he ordered a chicken brought in. He plucked it alive, in front of all them, down to the last feather, down to the red flesh, until only the comb was left on its head. "And now watch," he said, and let the chicken go. It could have gone off where it wished, but it went nowhere. It was too hot in the sun and too cold in the shade. The poor bird could only press itself against Stalin's boots. Then he tossed it a crumb of grain, and the bird followed him wherever he went. Otherwise, it would have fallen over from hunger. "That," he told his pupils, "is how you govern our people."

Neither does this anecdote demonstrate the entire mentality and the character of Stalin, nor does the history tell anything about chicken. However, the brutal orders, which Stalin gave to hunt down and prosecute his comrades, including Molotov, draw a clear picture of tyrannical Georgian from Gori.

This anecdote reminds us of something that the polemologist Julien Freund already warned about: societies obey for one of these two reasons, whether education or fear of punishment. It is also a key element to differentiate totalitarianism from authoritarianism. While in authoritarian regimes obedience to the leader is forced by the use of the instruments of coercion

(police, courts, army), in totalitarian regimes all available means are used (mass media, censorship, besides the coercion bodies) to spread their propaganda and convince the inhabitants of a state to obey without questioning the orders received.

In democratic regimes, these elements can also be found, only to a lesser degree and with the possibility of changing leaders every few years. The main difference is that in a democratic regime the debate is not stolen from the citizens, citizens can debate on all matters and their opinions can easily reach decision-making bodies, which leads us to talk about the general systems theory.

David Easton's General Systems Theory

David Easton promoted the so-called "game theory" and proposed an analysis of society based on the systems, a theory that would allow us to understand how the relationship of any society works with its political leaders. In this way, he affirmed that political decision-makers send the citizens a series of messages in which they can sense what their next decisions will be. This is done through "probe balloons", id est, draft bills that are leaked out to the press, a tweet, official speeches, and many other means. Easton called these early messages "outputs". These outputs reach the public and citizens making them react to these announcements by returning feedback to political decision-makers in the form of "inputs" (an opinion poll, a radio talk show, an article in a newspaper, a message on social media, and so forth). The Government, after seeing whether the input is positive or negative, can act accordingly, either ignoring the public opinion or considering it.

This description of how this political system works is essential to understand what kind of inputs or feedbacks the political decision-makers receive. If those inputs and comments are only negative, not taken seriously by governing bodies, sooner or later they can transform into a more or less violent social reaction, which can range from a peaceful demonstration to the murder of political leaders, terrorist attacks, or plots to carry out a coup d'état.

On the contrary, if the Government has the ability to make the population understand that these measures are the most appropriate, the people will support them or simply accept them. The measures that different governments have adopted during this pandemic are an example that reflects this theory well: similar measures in various countries have been taken better than in other places.

Precisely, what makes the difference between some situations and others is not the objective economic data but the resilience capacity of that society, the ability to resist changes and face new situations. An in-depth analysis of any epoch of change in history shows us that there might indeed have been economic crises in the past, but none of them produced such a change *per se*. During World War II, the economic situation was disastrous for the countries involved in the conflict, but sacrifices were requested from the citizens and they did so without offering much resistance; however, those same countries experienced violent domestic altercations once the threat of war disappeared, despite having enjoyed better economic indices.

This shows that justification, motivation for social action is crucial to understand why a group of people abandon their normal life and begin to dedicate themselves to change an aspect of society.

The pyramid of radicalization

At this point, it is appropriate to speak about the process of radicalization, which is a gradual process by which a person stops doing "normal life" to dedicate his existence completely to an ideological cause. This process can be completed in weeks or years, but it seems clear that several stages can be identified, which is why some authors speak of the "pyramid of radicalization" and others of "funnel theory". At the end, the idea is very similar, since it starts from the basis that not all those who begin this process culminate it with the use of violence (which would be the highest stage), but they do not pass the first or second level. In any case, each higher stage needs the lower or previous stage. In this scale or pyramid, at least three levels can be distinguished:

- 1) Radicalism.
- 2) Extremism.
- 3) Fundamentalism.

Only a few people jump from normal life and normal beliefs to the use of violence to achieve the goals set out at the end of this journey, at a posterior stage.

In the last European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2020, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation of EUPOL states that in Europe the main terrorist threat comes from jihadism done by people who were born or raised in Europe: "Ten people died as a result of terrorist attacks in the EU and 27 people were injured. All deaths and the injuries

of 26 people were the results of jihadist attacks; one person was injured in a right-wing terrorist attack"[2, 11]. Besides that, in EU territory there were 21 attacks made by jihadist groups, 6 by Right-wing, 26 by Left-wing, and 57 by Ethno-nationalist (3 by Single-issue and 6 Non-specified). The radical process is very similar in any trend, independently the basic ideology of the group (whether is Jihadist, Left-wing, Right-wing, or Ethno-nationalist).

As there were more deadly victims in Europe due to jihadism, that topic has attracted a lot of attention on that continent. The last victim was Samuel Paty, a French History professor in a high school near Paris. He was stabbed to death on October 16th; after he showed in class one of the offensive caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad published by Charlie Hebdo magazine. As a reminder, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published disgusting caricatures on Islamic prominent figures, in September 2005. Some months later, there were angry and violent reactions in some parts of the world and Charlie Hebdo published similar caricatures in November 2011; in January 2015, the offices of the magazine were attacked and two men killed twelve workers. Later, on September 25th, 2020, one man looking for revenge attacked the old offices of Charlie Hebdo again, but the publication is no longer using that place to work. Some days later, Paty used in class some of the offensive caricatures to initiate a debate on freedom of expression. That motivated the anger of some students' parents and one 18-year-old man beheaded the professor. For weeks, there were peaceful demonstrations in France supporting the teacher, the freedom of expression, the separation between religion and public life, and the model of public education as a place where secular values are taught. That triggered many reactions of prominent Islamic leaders around the world against the French President Emmanuel Macron.

At this point, it is useful to clarify some terms, as they are used as tools for analyzing very complex realities; the process is of transition from a peaceful religious belief to a violent terrorist act[3]. There, not everyone passes from one grade to another, so each field or level of this pyramid needs to be well defined. This distinction between groups is not a mere academic discussion, but affects the fight against terrorism, especially when police and judicial bodies are involved so that they can do better their job and the guilty people can go to jail if they really deserve it. Thus, for example, in 2007, the Supreme Court of Russia outlawed 15 organizations by labeling them as terrorists[4], and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) published a list that included extremist groups, Hizb ut Tahrir among them, to be persecuted within the territory of the member countries[5].

Given that Islam is a religion that permeates everything and does not recognize the separation between religion and politics[6], various positions (some even opposing) have emerged over the centuries about how that relationship should be, winning each time more strongly what we know as "political Islam"[7], which today applies almost exclusively to radical Islamic conceptions and the movements that emerged from them[8].

However, it cannot be said that these extremist groups are religious groups since their demands are more related to an economic-social nature (redistribution of income, right to private property, and access to natural resources, among others). Their only relationship with religion is that they profess one in particular[9]; nothing else. It is well known that the violent drift that some have continued to use Islam as a pretext has harmed Muslims themselves, who, for the vast majority, want a safe and peaceful life and feel powerless in the face of the fact that confrontation is taking place with terrorists to the terrain of cultures and religions[10]. In fact, to underline this awareness, Pope Francis signed a historical document during his Apostolic Journey to the United Arab Emirates in February 2019, together with the Grand Imam of Al- Azhar, Ahmed el-Tayeb; the title of this document is 'Human Fraternity for world peace and living together'[11].

Three variables will allow us to differentiate between one concept or another, realizing that reality far exceeds theoretical speculations and that classifications, especially in Social Sciences, are not definitive, much less closed. These variables have a cumulative effect so that the first can occur without the other two, but rarely the last could occur without the previous two. They are the desire to fulfill the Koranic precepts, the aspiration to direct politics from an adulterated version of Islam, and the use of violence for political purposes. Thus, the terms "Salafism" (exclusive for Sunnis) and "radicalism" refer to ideologies that advocate a return to the origins, to the roots. "Extremism" would imply assimilation of politics by religion (in this case, Islam). "Fundamentalism" and "Islamism" would refer to the ideological amalgam that justifies with Islam the use of violence to achieve political ends. The term "jihadism" (which comes from the

Arabic word jihad, “fight”) refers to armed struggle. The use of the term “Islamism” can lead to confusion since, for some, it simply refers to the religion founded by the Prophet Muhammad (as is the case with the terms Christ-Christianism or Buddha-Buddhism); but the meaning that is given more widely and that we will use in this work is that of a radical ideology that uses Islam as an excuse to achieve certain political goals, offering a particular vision of Islam and using it for its own benefit[12].

According to David A. Westbrook, “original Islam” is the practice of the Prophet Muhammad and the first four caliphs, where political life was perfected by Islam. The “historical Islam” understands that Islam is perfect, immutable, and eternal while the politics are imperfect and contingent. However, to this degree, religion-politics relations are not as sweet as they are usually painted, since political Islam tries to impose religion on the will of the rulers, seen as corrupt or sold to foreign powers. The authors cited in the previous paragraph, among others, defended this type of Islam. Its main objective is institutional: the founding of an Islamic state, led by sharia (Islamic law). Neo-fundamentalist Islam’s main objective is to launch a global jihad, to sow chaos at the international level, but not to create political institutions, since the “State” can wait. Its highest representative would be Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network[13].

The victory in 1989, with which the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was repelled, had a symbolic significance of a scope that we in the West are not aware of yet. In an interview with the so-called “father of the Taliban”, he argued that the struggle for the liberation of Afghanistan was jihad, as is the current struggle for the liberation of Iraq[14] or Syria, an opinion shared by Hizb ut-Tahrir in a pamphlet entitled A Warm Call from Hizb ut-Tahrir. Destroy the Fourth Crusader War, where it is stated:

“O Muslims! Your ancestors made conquests and spread justice throughout the world. Your ancestors destroyed the campaigns of the first Crusaders and the Tartars after those. Shouldn’t you proceed in the same way as them and emulate their steps, and destroy the new crusaders, so that you can achieve success in this life and the next (in the Dunya and the Akhirah)? Let the armies come to the aid of the Muslims who in Iraq seek your help”.

Therefore, the term “jihadism” would refer to the ideology that sustains the armed struggle for the defense of Islam against those who are identified as enemies of it (whether they really are or not), based on reinterpreted, manipulated, and misrepresented quotes from the Koran[15].

As stated in some paragraphs before, it is shocking that people born and/or raised in Europe are the perpetrators of such terrorist attacks. Some of them were radicalized in few weeks while others were raised in an extremist environment, received non-peaceful preaching at the mosque, and were confirmed at home. On the other hand, the decline of the Western civilization, the corruption of the traditions, the loss of the faith, the mockery (even, clear insult) of Christian beliefs have transformed Western countries into places where believers of Islam find difficult to live as it is obligatory to accept gay marriage, gender ideology, free abortion, euthanasia,... Western civilization is no longer based on Christian beliefs, as not only have main political and cultural leaders rejected Christianity as a source of legitimization but also they hesitate about the existence of the truth and objectivity. Reason and science have died.

Conclusions.

In conclusion, throughout history, human beings have sought to survive. To do that, we must meet basic needs such as eating, dressing, or seeking shelter from the weather that can be accomplished alone, or in small family groups. Nevertheless, it is also necessary to defend oneself, to protect these families from attacks by animals or even other human groups. Little by little, societies became more complex and broader in which political entities (the nation, the empire) were created where a single person made political decisions. This authoritarian model was justified by the difficulty of combining the diverse (sometimes even contrary) interests of a large number of people and territories.

The reason for obeying the father of the family or the chief of the tribe was self-evident: one’s own survival. It was also more or less clear when larger cities or even the city-states of Greece began to be built (protecting the city, which is protecting the lifestyle, the level of economic and cultural development reached by all). However, it became less evident when the rule of the rulers extended over large areas of land, causing different revolts, rebellions, or even revolutions to arise over the centuries. Anyway, after each one of them, the situation calmed down and obedience returned. The Glorious Revolution of the s. XVII in England is a bright example, as it was after the French Revolution at the end of the s. XVIII.

What happens to people who disagree with the decisions made? They can show their discomfort

in many ways, depending on what is at stake for them. If it is a measure that does not affect them directly, they can simply complain in an informal conversation. If they feel concerned, involved in some way, they can even organize conferences or public meetings. If they think that their life depends on it and they are motivated enough, they usually give themselves entirely to that cause and do not stop until the situation changes. The latter is what happens in revolutions, where there are “ideologues”, “preachers” and “actors”: while some provide an ideological justification for action, others spread those ideas among the population and others jump into action. At that point, people can move on with their lives or they can get involved in the revolutionary struggle.

As can be seen, revolutions are not the decision of the majority but the result of the action of a minority. History constantly proves this, for example when in France in 1789 a small group of the Third Estate claimed the representativeness of the entire French nation and it was invented that they had been elected to draw up a constitution while in reality they had been elected to be representatives in the meeting of the States-General; or like when in December 1917 the elections to the Constituent Assembly in Russia the Bolsheviks obtained about nine million votes while the Social Revolutionary Party obtained almost double (more than 16 million). The riots in Kyrgyzstan (2005, 2010, 2020) where a few thousand people took over Parliament and overthrew governments on the Central Asian “island of democracy” would also be another example of this.

Currently, the rulers open two-way communication channels between themselves and the citizens, so that they can freely express their opinions about the decisions that are being implemented. An example of this can be seen in the channels opened by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev coming to power in 2016 and his Uzbekistan’s Development Strategy for 2017-2021. That is the smartest way to run a country.

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