ISSN 2181-9505
Doi Journal 10.26739/181-9505

Philosophy and Life

FALSAFA VA HAYOT • ФИЛОСОФИЯ И ЖИЗНЬ

2026 №3 (34)



ISSN 2181-9505
Doi Journal 10.26739/2181-9505

Mirzo Ulug'bek nomidagi O‘zbekiston Milliy Universiteti

O‘zbekiston Respublikasi Vazirlar Mahkamasi huzuridagi
Imom Buxoriy xalqaro ilmiy-tadqiqot markazi
O‘zbekiston falsafa jamiyati

Национальный университет Узбекистана имени Мирзо Улугбека

Международный научно-исследовательский центр Имам Бухари
при Кабинете Министров Республики Узбекистан
Философское общество Узбекистана

The National University of Uzbekistan named after Mirzo Ulugbek

Imam Bukhari International Research Center under the Cabinet of Ministers
of the Republic of Uzbekistan
Philosophical Society of Uzbekistan

FALSAFA VA HAYOT
XALQARO JURNAL

ФИЛОСОФИЯ И ЖИЗНЬ
МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ ЖУРНАЛ

PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

2026 №3 (34)

Jurnal bir yilda 4 marta nashr qilinadi.
Журнал выходит 4 раза в год.
The journal is published 4 times in a year.

Toshkent

“Falsafa va hayot” xalqaro jurnal, “Философия и жизнь” международный журнал, “Philosophy and Life” international journal

Tahrir kengashi

Abdildina Raushan – Qozog‘iston Respublikasi Milliy fanlar akademiyasi akademigi, falsafa fanlari doktori, professor (Qozog‘iston)

Botukanova Gulmira – Qirg‘iziston Respublikasi Prezidenti huzuridagi Milliy fanlar akademiyasining vitse-prezidenti falsafa fanlari doktori, professor, (Qirg‘iziston)

Mamedzade Ilham – Azarbayjon Milliy fanlar akademiyasi Falsafa va sotsiologiya instituti direktori, falsafa fanlari doktori, professor (Azarbayjon)

Skarantino Luka Mariya – Bari universiteti professori, falsafa fanlari doctori, Jahon falsafa jamiyatlari federatsiyasi boshqaruvi a’zosi (Italiya)

Smirnov Andrey – Rossiya Federatsiyasi FA akademigi, Rossiya falsafa jamiyati prezidenti, falsafa fanlari doktori, professor (Rossiya Federatsiyasi)

Seytaxmedova Natal’ya – Qozog‘iston milliy fanlar akademiyasi akademigi, falsafa fanlari doktori, professor (Qozog‘iston)

Tsuy Veyxan – Xitoy ijtimoiy fanlar Akademiyasi vitse-prezidenti, DSc, professor, (Xitoy Xalq Respublikasi)

Chumakov, Aleksandr – M.Lomonosov nomidagi Moskva davlat universiteti professori, falsafa fanlari doktori, (Rossiya Federatsiyasi)

Muassislar:

Mirzo Ulug‘bek nomidagi O‘zbekiston Milliy universiteti

O‘zbekiston Respublikasi Vazirlar Mahkamasi huzuridagi Imom Buxoriy xalqaro ilmiy - tadqiqot markazi

O‘zbekiston falsafa jamiyati

Expert lawyers MCHJ Elc.uz

Ro‘yxatga olinganligi haqidagi 1175 sonli guvohnoma O‘zbekiston matbuot va axborot agentligi tomonidan 20.02.2018 yilda berilgan.

Bosh muharrir:

Shermuxamedova Niginaxon – f.f.d., professor (O‘zbekiston)

Bosh muharrir o‘rinbosari:

Aslanova Rabiyat – f. f. d, professor (Azarbayjon)

Mas’ul muharrir:

Muhamedova Zamira – f.f.d., professor (O‘zbekiston)

Tahrir hay’ati:

Allahyarova Tahira – f.f.d., professor (Azarbayjon)

Andirjanova Gulnar – siyosiy fanlari doktori, professor (Qozog‘iston)

Abasov Ali – f.f.d., professor (Azarbayjon)

Axamer Gilbert – f.f.d., professor (Avstriya)

Buzarinejad Yahyo – f.f.d, professor (Eron)

Bilalov Mustafo – f.f.d., professor (Dog’iston, Rossiya Federatsiyasi)

Gabitov Tursin – f.f.d., professor (Qozog‘iston)

Gezalov Ariz – f.f.n., professor (Rossiya Federatsiyasi)

Kerimov Eyyub – f.f.d., professor (Azarbayjon)

Kurmangalieva Galiya – f.f.d., professor (Qozog‘iston)

Kurbonova Lola – falsafa fanlari doctori DSc, dotsent (O’zbekiston)

Lazarevich Anatoliy – f.f.n., dotsent (Belorus)

Olatunji Feliks – PhD, dotsent (Nigeriya)

Paxruddinov Shukriddin – siyosiy fanlari doktori professor (O‘zbekiston)

Pardayev Sultonmurod – falsafa doktori (PhD), (O‘zbekiston)

Sergeev Mixail – f.f.d., professor (AQSh)

Sagikizi Ayajan – f.f.d., professor (Qozog‘iston)

Tulenova Gulmira – f.f.d., professor (O‘zbekiston)

Tashdelen Vefa – f.f.d., professor (Turkiya)

Tyukmaeva Aida – falsafa doktori PhD (O‘zbekiston)

Hakimov Nazar – f.f.d., professor (O‘zbekiston)

Xudoydodzoda Farrux – f.f.d., professor (Tojikiston)

Xudoyberganov Rovshan – f.f.d., (DSc) professor (O‘zbekiston)

Mahmadizoda Nozim – f.f.d., professor (Tojikiston)

Naushabayeva Asem – falsafa doktori (PhD), professor (Turkiya)

Urmanbetova Jildiz – f.f.d., professor (Qirg‘iziston)

Baychun Chjan – f.f.d., professor (Xitoy)

Sharipova Erkayim – f.f.d., professor (Qirg‘iziston)

Ilmiy kotib:

Xidirov Mustafo – falsafa fanlari doktori (DSc), dotsent (O‘zbekiston)

Musahhihlar:

Qodirov Javlon – (O‘zbekiston)

Po‘latov Anvar – (O‘zbekiston)

CONTENTS

PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Allaberdiyeva Lale Agageldiyevna	CHARACTERISTICS AND VERIFICATION OF SOURCES ON THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE MAMUNID STATE IN KHWARAZM	9-23
Fakunle, O. A., Raifu, I. O., Adedire, A. A.	HISTORICIZING ASO-OKE PRODUCTION IN ISEYIN TOWN, SOUTH-WEST NIGERIA	24-42
Mirzarakhimov Bakhtiyor Khoshimovich	AXIOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF TOURISM: A SOCIO-PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS	43-54
Nazira Omurkulovna Kasymova	THE ROLE OF PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION	55-65

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

Annagulyyeva Maral Muhammedovna	HALK MASLAHATY AS AN ETHNOPEDAGOGICAL FACTOR IN SPIRITUAL AND MORAL EDUCATION AND INDIVIDUAL SOCIALIZATION	66-83
Kamilov Davron Zafarovich	THE PHENOMENON OF EMERGENCE AND ITS REFLECTION IN SYNCRETIC THINKING	84-95
Saifnazarov Ismail	SYNERGETIC METHODOLOGY FOR STUDYING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF DIGITAL CIVILIZATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS	96-116
Khaydrova Akida Khurramovna	KNOWLEDGE SELECTION AND EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY	117-124

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

Solomon Kolawole AWE, Oluwaseun Opeyemi Jemilehin	KANTIAN RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AS A PRINCIPLE OF GOVERNANCE IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA	125-145
Michael Olatunji ONI	SARTREAN HUMANISM AS AN IMPERATIVE FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF CULTURAL IDEALS IN AFRICA	146-157

WORLD CULTURE AND RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS

Jimoh, Olumuyiwa Wahab	THE NEED FOR MORALITY IN NATURAL LAW THEORY	158-179

UDK: 1:342.7:321.01(6)
10.5281/zenodo.23658445

Solomon Kolawole AWE
Osun State University, Osogbo,
College of Humanities and Culture,
Faculty of Culture,
Ikire Campus,
e-mail: solomon.awe@uniosun.edu.ng
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5959-9052
(Osun State, Nigeria)

Oluwaseun Opeyemi JEMILEHIN
Osun State University, Osogbo,
College of Humanities and Culture,
Faculty of Culture,
Ikire Campus,
e-mail: oluwaseun.jemilehin@uniosun.edu.ng
(Osun State, Nigeria)

KANTIAN RESPECT FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AS A PRINCIPLE OF GOVERNANCE IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

Abstract. Human dignity provides a moral foundation for human rights and a principle of governance aimed at protecting individuals and securing the conditions for a dignified life. Kant's understanding of dignity as the unconditional intrinsic worth of the person, grounded in rationality, freedom, and autonomy, offers a basis for affirming the accountability of political authority to individuals and rejecting their treatment merely as means to political ends. However, human rights violations, corruption, and abuses of power in several African countries hinder the implementation of this principle and undermine people's opportunities to live with dignity. Accordingly, this article aims to elucidate the philosophical substance of Kant's conception of human dignity through critical and analytical methods and to establish its significance for reorienting governance in contemporary Africa towards respect for persons, the protection of their rights, and the improvement of their quality of life.

Keywords: Human dignity, Autonomy, Freedom, Rationality, Immanuel Kant.

INTRODUCTION

The idea of human dignity is a topical issue that cuts across different epochs in human history. It has received attention in different fields of study. However, it has been discussed and applied to issues related to man and his environment in ethics and social and political philosophy. In moral philosophy, for instance, it has been applied to examine and interrogate different ethical issues related to abortion, euthanasia, autonomy, animal rights, and the like. It interrogates how humans ought to be treated morally [Sinha, 2020:16]. In social and political discourse, it is discussed in relation to issues such as justice, equality, human rights, and the rule of law. The issue of human dignity is worthy of further reflection in our contemporary society, considering the moral and social decline in the status, value, and worth of humans in Africa, particularly in Nigeria. In a more general sense, human dignity is simply the recognition and respect accorded to human beings by virtue of possessing intrinsic worth and special value that distinguishes them from animals. This understanding suggests that the intrinsic worth of human beings is not to be traded or priced in exchange for what undermines and commodifies human dignity. It is also correct to assert, as argued by some scholars like Jeff Malpas and Lickiss (2007), that the question of human dignity cannot be meaningfully discussed without recourse to the question of what it is to be human. Following this line of thought, Malpas and Norelle submit that "to attend to human dignity presupposes an understanding of the nature of human being" [2007:19]. On human nature, Motsamai Molefe remarks that philosophical inquiries and elaborations on human dignity are essentially meta-ethical in nature [2022:18]. It is meta-ethical because it concerns the identification of the ontological and moral distinctness and elevation of humans above other things in existence. Interestingly, human dignity is intimately related to human rights. The argument is that human rights have their basis and foundation in the acceptance and recognition of human dignity. This explains the role of human rights in protecting and promoting what is most valuable about being human (Habaermas, 2010:464-480). This aligns with Freeman's (1995) submission, as cited by Molefe, that "one way to interpret the importance of human dignity in our cultures is in terms of it being the foundation of human rights." [Molefe, 2022:1]. Consequently, the denial, violation, or abuse of human rights is tantamount to undermining human dignity. In this sense, human dignity is construed as a struggle against domination, exploitation, inequality, injustice, discrimination, subjugation, oppression, mistreatment, and disregard for human lives. The disastrous events of the Second World War aptly capture the necessity of a call for recognition and respect for human dignity in international law and governance. The Second World War witnessed the greatest cruelty of man to man and the commodification of humans for personal gain. This was a time in history when the lives and dignity of humans were of no value, and humans were used as pawns in the contest for power, supremacy, and domination. Discrimination against races prevailed, and the unjust mistreatment of humans took centre stage during this period. The respect and recognition of human dignity, characterised by inalienable rights, were not only scarce but were absolutely

absent. To revive and reawaken human dignity, the United Nations, under the General Assembly, adopted a democratized sense of universal dignity that ought to be respected in all persons (Allosbrook, 2023:27). Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the idea of human dignity has been at the centre of ethical, legal, and political discourse [Hughes, 2011:1-24]. Now, bringing this discourse to a practical perspective in Africa, particularly Nigeria, a serious researcher will pause to ask these significant questions: Is respect for human dignity well pronounced in the process of governance in Africa? Does the government recognise and place a premium on human dignity in the formulation and implementation of policies? What mechanisms, if any, are in place to protect and safeguard human dignity? No doubt, thorough research into the process and art of governing in Africa, particularly Nigeria, will automatically provide answers to these questions. It is not a novel idea to posit that governance in Africa is marred by policies and decision-making that conspicuously threaten and undermine human dignity. For instance, insecurity is heightened in the state with reports of continuous killings and destruction of property. This menace continues unabated because the government adopts a lukewarm attitude toward curbing the menace that arbitrarily jeopardises human lives. Rather than take fierce action against terrorists and bandits, the government negotiates with them, accommodates them, and even grants pardons to some of these criminals. This results in the wanton killing of innocent people. Besides, the government shatters the dignity of the people with continued policies that reduce people's quality of life and keep them in a state of penury. The provision of infrastructure and social amenities is politicised in the sense that the government makes these facilities available only for its own gain. Projects are usually commissioned when it is time for another election, and at that time, they move from south to north to commission substandard projects just to take pictures to be used for campaign during the electioneering period. It is no wonder that it is easy for them to buy votes during the election period since they clearly understand the social and economic state of the people. Also, in some parts of Africa, human dignity and, by extension, human rights are not recognised and respected. In a democratized society, where the protection of human rights and respect for human dignity are distinctive features, the government forcefully prevails over the people and unjustly tramples upon their rights and dignity. A reminder is the year 2020 #EndSARS protest that was forcefully disrupted by the government, accompanied by the killing of determined innocent Nigerian youths and the unwarranted arrest of some people tagged hoodlums. The protest is a significant movement and revolution, not only against bad government but also a struggle against police brutality that has continually inflicted pain, suffering, and injury on the people.

It is within this context that this paper seeks to examine Kant's Categorical Imperatives, which emphasise the principle of the end in itself, autonomy, and the rationality of humans as a viable moral foundation for governance in Africa. This paper contends, contrary to some perspectives that consider the notion of human dignity irrelevant to moral and political discourse, that recognising and respecting

human dignity can enhance the quality of governance and eliminate the commodification of humans as a commodity that can be exchanged for other goods, while also safeguarding and upholding fundamental human rights. In this manner, the government will not be viewed as antagonistic to the demands and needs of the people. In achieving the aim of this paper, this paper is divided into four sections. The task of the first section is to conceptualise the idea of human dignity. The second section will engage Kant's approach to the discourse of human dignity. The third section will briefly examine the synergy between Kant's notion of human dignity and African perspectives of human dignity. The last section will consider the notions of freedom, autonomy, and moral virtues as legitimate moral frameworks of governance. We conclude that legitimacy extends beyond electoral victory. As such, enduring acceptance and recognition require the establishment of political structures and institutions that protect human dignity, fundamental rights, and foster an environment conducive to individual flourishing.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

The study adopts a qualitative philosophical approach to examine Kantian respect for human dignity as a normative principle of governance in contemporary Africa. The primary materials comprise Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Critique of Practical Reason, and The Metaphysics of Morals. These works provide the conceptual basis for examining dignity, autonomy, rationality, moral obligation, and respect for persons. Relevant scholarly literature on Kantian ethics, human rights, and governance in African contexts provides supplementary material. Conceptual analysis is used to clarify the relationship between human dignity and the principles of freedom, autonomy, and rational agency. Particular attention is given to Kant's distinction between price and dignity and to the formulation of the categorical imperative requiring humanity to be treated always as an end and never merely as a means. Interpretive analysis situates these concepts within Kant's moral philosophy and considers their implications for the exercise of political authority.

Critical analysis examines how corruption, coercion, abuses of power, and violations of human rights conflict with respect for persons. These practices are considered as ethically relevant forms of governance rather than as characteristics uniformly attributable to African states. Normative analysis identifies the obligations that respect for dignity places on public institutions, including accountability, protection of individual rights, and the avoidance of arbitrary treatment. Comparative philosophical analysis relates Kantian principles to the governance problems discussed in the article while acknowledging differences among African political and social contexts. The argument proceeds from the clarification of Kant's conception of dignity to the evaluation of governance practices and the formulation of principles for public administration. The study is theoretical and does not involve interviews, surveys, or statistical measurement; its conclusions concern the ethical justification and potential relevance of a dignity-oriented approach to governance.

DISCUSSION AND RESULTS

The concept of human dignity admits several philosophical interpretations and has no single universally accepted definition. It remains a contested concept in the scholarly literature [Molefe, 2022; Metz, 2012:19-37; Rodriguez, 2015:743-756]. Despite this lack of consensus, a working understanding of human dignity is necessary to clarify the ethical standards by which governance is evaluated in this study. An appropriate starting point for this conceptual clarification is the historical meaning of the word dignity. The word dignity derives from the Latin dignitas, associated with honour, respect, prestige, and personal worth. Two implications immediately follow from this conception. First, dignity understood primarily as social distinction is selectively attributed. It belongs to those whose social standing, public office, or political authority places them in a recognised position of honour. This interpretation resembles the status-based understanding of dignity in ancient Rome, where political office, public reputation, and elevated social standing were important sources of dignitas. Access to the principal political offices in ancient Rome was reserved for men, while women and people outside the privileged social ranks were excluded from the corresponding forms of public authority. In this political sense, dignity expressed a hierarchy of recognition rather than an equal status shared by every human being. Dignity as honour and prestige conforms to Sulmasy's attributed sense of dignity. In his words, "we attribute dignity to dignitaries, those we admire, those who carry themselves in a particular way, or those who have certain talents, skills, or powers" [Sulmasy, 2008:473]. This is the sense in which we refer to some people as dignitaries by virtue of their public responsibilities, professional distinction, or recognised accomplishments.
Second, this particular understanding of dignity locates its source in social recognition rather than in human nature itself. Such dignity may be earned, conferred, or inherited through a socially recognised position. The ethical difficulty arises when this selective conception becomes the basis for determining whose interests deserve protection: differences in status may then legitimise discrimination and unequal treatment.

A broader interpretation understands human dignity as the moral worth possessed by individuals by virtue of their humanity. This type of dignity connotes that there is something special and morally significant in being human. Dignity, as conceived in this sense, is intrinsic to human nature. Consequently, it is universal since it has its source in the ontology of human nature [Korsgaard, 1983:169-195]. Charles Taylor explains the emergence of universal human dignity in relation to, and in opposition to, the older conception of dignity as honour [1992:28]. Molefe maintains that "the idea of ontology of beings is characterised by a value-endowing capacity that explains our intrinsic dignity, which grounds the recognition and respect we owe towards them" [2024:239]. In contrast to dignity understood as an achievement, intrinsic or inherent dignity is regarded as belonging to the person from the outset of human life. By implication, its possession is not a matter of social or political status, but of the understanding of human nature through which

every person is recognised as a bearer of moral worth. Simply put, *intrinsic* or *inherent* dignity is what humans have because they are born with it. This points to the fact that it is not earned and no effort is required to possess it [Donnelly, 2015:1-22]. On this account, dignity is inalienable: neither a loss of social position nor another person's degrading treatment extinguishes it.

Sulmasy, as noted by Molefe, explains that dignity can also be construed in the attributed sense [2022:6-7]. Dignity, in the attributed sense, refers to "the kind of value that emerges as a consequence of human choice in relation to attaching a certain status to a set of events or activities" [Molefe, 2022:7]. Sulmasy's conceptions of the attributed sense of dignity, as earlier noted, correspond to dignity understood as honour, prestige, and socially conferred respect. This type of dignity is conventional and humanly created based on human skills, talents, charisma, or powers. Because this form of dignity depends on recognition and social circumstances, it is selectively distributed and can be lost when the relevant status or recognition disappears.

The inflorescent sense of dignity is another type of dignity identified by Sulmasy. This dignity is used to refer to a state of affairs in which human actions are expressive of the intrinsic value of human nature [Sulmasy, 2008:473]. It concerns the exercise of human capabilities through habitual excellence and virtuous conduct. In this interpretation, dignity flourishes when a person's actions express the intrinsic worth already associated with human nature. This aligns with what Rosen (2012) calls dignified virtue. This sense of dignity requires nurturing. Its expression can diminish when virtuous habits weaken, even though the intrinsic dignity that such conduct expresses remains intact. This distinction prevents moral failure from being confused with the loss of a person's basic human worth.

These distinctions explain why a universally accepted definition remains difficult to establish. For the purposes of the present discussion, the preceding interpretations can be organised into three principal perspectives. First, dignity can denote elevated status within relations between people. In this sense, political power, talents, skills, or charisma distinguish some individuals from others. Such status is exclusive and cannot provide a sufficient basis for the equal moral standing of all human beings. Cicero offers a different perspective on dignity understood as an elevated status. In this interpretation of his view, human rationality provides a basis for distinguishing the standing of humans from that of other animals. Here the distinction concerns the standing of humanity in relation to non-human animals, rather than the ranking of one human group above another. The second sense of dignity identified above is the intrinsic dignity that all humans have because they are born humans. Third, virtue-based dignity concerns the capacity to express moral excellence through conduct. These perspectives address different questions: social recognition, basic human worth, and the moral quality of action.

In addition to the notions of human dignity discussed above, there is another conception of dignity that is worth examining and central to the focus of this paper. According to Rick Lucke, as cited by Ebunoluwa Oduwole and Ademola Fayemi,

"(human) dignity is the quality or state of being worthy of esteem or respect, and worthy of absence of intentionally imposed physical or emotional mental discomfort, dehumanisation, degradation, violations, as well as relief or prevention of such discomfort whenever possible" (emphasis added) (2022:3). Dignity, in this sense, aligns with Rosen's right to be treated with dignity (2012:54). This interpretation emphasises a deliberate commitment to avoiding the infliction of harm, pain, humiliation, and degrading treatment on others. This notion of dignity ensures that the sanctity of human lives and the essence of human beings are not jeopardised, objectified, and degraded. In a similar vein, human dignity encompasses individuals, institutions, and groups in society acting knowingly and willingly to define their worth, affirm the sanctity of human life, elevate the quality of human life, and obey the rules and norms that protect and preserve the values and worth attached to the dignity of humans (emphasis added) [Ujomu, 2019:272]. These conceptual distinctions establish the basis for examining Kant's account of human dignity. Its relationship to intrinsic worth, moral conduct, and the right to respectful treatment provides the conceptual foundation for considering its relevance within African philosophical and political contexts.

Kant offers a secular view on the nature of human dignity, grounded in rational nature and the capacity for moral self-legislation, expressed through autonomy and rationality. Accordingly, Kant's understanding of dignity is not an achievement or elevation of status based on skills, talents, wealth, or charisma; rather, it is an integral feature of rational human existence, which can neither be given nor taken away (emphasis added) [Sinha, 2020:16]. More precisely, Kant distinguishes between price, which admits an equivalent, and dignity, which does not. Things that have a price can be exchanged for an equivalent, whereas dignity denotes an intrinsic worth beyond such substitution [Kant, 2001:192]. He explains further that:

Whatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of mankind has market value; whatever, without presupposing a want, corresponds to a certain taste, that is to a satisfaction in the mere purposeless play of our faculties, has a fancy value; but that which constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an end in itself, this has not merely a relative worth, i.e. value, but an intrinsic worth, that is dignity [Kant, 2001:192].

This distinction places dignity outside the sphere of exchangeable goods and comparable market values. A person's worth cannot be replaced by an equivalent object, benefit, or payment. The kingdom of ends expresses a moral order in which rational beings recognise one another as ends in themselves and as participants in moral legislation. The relevant question is therefore what grounds this intrinsic worth. Kant locates it in morality and in humanity insofar as humanity is capable of morality. His argument concerns rational nature rather than a comparative assessment of a person's wealth, usefulness, or social achievement: Now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in himself, since by this alone is it possible that he should be a legislating member in the kingdom of ends. Thus, morality and humanity, as capable of it, are that which alone has

dignity. Skill and diligence in labour have a market value; with lively imagination and humour, have fancy value; on the other hand, fidelity to promises, benevolence from principle (not from instinct), have an intrinsic worth [2001:192].

The passage connects dignity with rational nature and the capacity for moral legislation. The categorical imperative addresses rational agents, requiring them to recognise the moral standing of others as well as their own. Applied to human relations, this principle supports equal respect irrespective of social status, achievement, or race. Its application to infancy and impaired agency requires particular care: equal respect should not depend on a person's immediate ability to exercise reason or make independent choices. The relevance of this issue becomes clearer in the subsequent discussion of vulnerability and communal relations. Kant's notion of human dignity is grounded in his conception of morality. Put differently, to understand the universality and ontological endowment of human nature as a being capable of making free choices and reasoning, it is necessary to examine Kant's moral philosophy. Kantian ethics connects the moral worth of action with its performance from duty and requires respect for humanity in oneself and others. The concept of the will helps explain the motivation underlying this obligation. What determines whether one's action is morally worthy or condemnable is the will from which it is done. A good will is good without qualification; its worth does not depend on external success, advantageous consequences, or the approval of others. In his words:

Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will. Intelligence, wit, judgment, and other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good [Kant, 2001:151].

The passage distinguishes moral worth from instrumental usefulness. Intelligence, courage, and perseverance may serve either morally worthy or destructive purposes, depending on the will that directs them. A good will is therefore valued in itself rather than solely for the results it produces. This does not require indifference to consequences; it means that beneficial outcomes alone cannot establish the moral worth of an action or justify an otherwise wrongful maxim. According to Kant: … as one which is to influence the will, therefore, admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination must be to produce a will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason it was absolutely necessary. This will then, though not indeed the sole and complete good, must be the supreme good and the condition of every other, even of the desire of happiness [2001:154].

Kant's conception of a good will is clarified through the ethics of duty. For human agents, whose inclinations may conflict with moral requirements, acting from duty expresses the commitment of the will to the moral law. Kant emphasises

duty as a *conditio sine qua non* for morally praiseworthy actions. Joseph Omoregbe [2011:57] explains this distinction as follows: "any action that is performed for the sake of duty has moral worth, while any action that is performed for any other reason other than for the sake of duty has no moral worth." Kant makes a distinction between acting for the sake of duty and acting according to duty. The latter describes conduct that conforms outwardly to what duty requires, although its motivation need not be duty itself. An agent may, for example, act from self-interest because a direct or indirect benefit is expected [Omoregbe, 2011:58]. Acting from duty, by contrast, means acting because the moral requirement is recognised as binding, rather than merely because compliance promises an advantage. Bringing this to a practical perspective, the dignity of humans is respected when one's actions towards others are not based on self-interest and personal gain. The relevant moral commitment is to respect the person even when doing so brings no private advantage. Public officials must still consider the foreseeable effects of their decisions, but those effects cannot make the instrumentalisation of persons morally acceptable. The point emphasised here is that it is our duty as humans to protect and respect the liberty, rights, and freedoms of the people, and to ensure they are not denied the rights and liberties through which their moral worth as human persons receives practical recognition.

Kant's conception of human dignity is further articulated through the categorical imperative. The distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives clarifies the unconditional character of moral obligation. A hypothetical imperative prescribes an action conditionally, in relation to a desired end. An action, in this sense, is good because it serves as a means to certain ends. Such an action is said to be contingent and not guided by the necessity of moral law. A hypothetical imperative thus specifies what an agent should do if a particular purpose is to be achieved. By contrast, the categorical imperative represents an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end [Kant, 2001:172]. Kant explains that "if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical" [2001:172]. In another sense, Kant observes that the categorical imperative commands a certain conduct immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it [2001:174]. To safeguard the dignity of human persons, Kant formulated some principles with which human actions must conform in order to respect human dignity. The first principle states that "act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This principle requires an agent to examine whether the maxim of an action can consistently be willed as a universal law for rational beings. It does not merely ask whether an individual would welcome receiving the same treatment, nor does it make respect conditional on another person's reciprocity. Its force lies in excluding exceptional permissions that an agent claims for themselves while denying their universal validity. Mutual respect follows from the equal standing of rational agents under moral law, rather than from a bargain in which respect is exchanged only when it is returned. For

instance, to test the moral worthiness of a lying promise, one should ask, "Should I be content that my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise) should hold good as a universal law, for myself as well as for others [Kant, 2004:154]?" The problem with a knowingly false promise is not simply that the promise-maker dislikes being deceived. If false promising became a universal practice, the trust on which promising depends would be undermined, frustrating the very purpose of the maxim. A deceptive promise also prevents the other person from making an informed choice and thereby fails to respect that person's rational agency and dignity.

The second principle of the categorical imperative, as formulated by Kant, states that: "act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end in itself, never simply as means only [2001:186]." This principle suggests that rational beings exist as ends in themselves, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used for other purposes. This formulation raises a practical question: how can people pursue their purposes through cooperation without treating one another merely as means? An ordinary example clarifies the distinction. If I wish to go to the supermarket to get some groceries, I may engage a taxi driver to take me there, and I will pay him on arrival. Obviously, I used the taxi driver as a means to achieve my goal of getting to the supermarket to buy some groceries. The point is that Kant does not mean to say that we do not use others as means to our ends; however, he rejects treating them merely as means while disregarding their agency and moral worth. In the taxi example, informed agreement, fair payment, and recognition of the driver's own purposes distinguish legitimate cooperation from exploitation. This requirement rests on the distinction between persons and things: persons have a moral standing that cannot be reduced to relative usefulness or an equivalent price. Rational beings are ends in themselves, and their agency cannot legitimately be displaced by another person's unilateral purposes. The requirement therefore prohibits commodification that disregards persons' own ends, rather than every instance of paid work or mutually agreed assistance. The "end in itself" principle therefore excludes exploitation, enslavement, and abuse, because these practices disregard the independent moral standing and agency of those subjected to them. The principle has important implications for reciprocal social relationships, although the obligation to respect another person remains binding even without reciprocation. It requires recognition of others' permissible ends and, through duties of beneficence, appropriate support for their pursuit. This does not entail adopting every purpose that another person happens to hold; morally impermissible ends cannot become objects of obligatory assistance. This understanding of personhood is expressed as follows:

A human person can be construed as the rational inner purposiveness that is non-substitutable and irreducible, and that enables access to the moral law. It unifies the human person for the sake of the fulfilment of the higher purposiveness that nature has set for human beings: to act in accordance with the moral law. This constitutive structure of personhood has dignity [Kumar, 2021:9].

In addition, Kant attributes dignity to the principle of autonomy. A good will recognises persons as bearers of intrinsic worth and refuses to treat them merely as instruments of unrelated purposes. The connection between a good will and autonomy is therefore central to this account. Autonomy, Kant remarks, "is the basis of the dignity of human nature and of every other rational nature" [Kant, 2001:193]. Accordingly, Kant maintains that the intrinsic worth of humans entails the volition and freedom to legislate moral laws and be subject to those laws. Kant accordingly attributes "sublimity" and "dignity" to the person fulfilling all his duties, not merely because he is subject to the moral law, but to the extent that he gives himself the law such that he can regard himself as the legislator of the law [Kumar, 2021:10]. On that basis, Kant concludes that "… the dignity of a rational being is obeying no law but that which he himself also gives and participates in" (emphasis added) [Kant, 2001:191].

In honouring this dignity, Kant maintains that rational beings ought to cultivate the strength of will to act and conform to moral laws in accordance with duty. The inculcation of this strength of will is a virtue. Virtue involves moral resolve and the strength to overcome inclinations and non-rational impediments that conflict with the moral law [Kumar, 2021:10]. Kant considers the commitment to others' happiness and the attainment of one's perfection as virtuous dispositions. In other words, it is a strong will to reject any inclinations and evil intentions that contradict universal moral laws and undermine the moral worth of others as rational beings. In this connection, Paul Formosa argues that virtue requires the power to resist both actual and counterfactual temptations to immorality that jeopardise human dignity [Formosa, 2017:9].

These arguments allow a comparison between Kant's account and the conceptions of dignity outlined in the preceding discussion. Kant's conception may be interpreted as assigning a moral status to rational beings, but this status differs fundamentally from the hierarchical dignity associated with ancient Rome. Whereas Kant's account assigns dignity to rational beings through their capacity for morality, status in ancient Rome was exclusively reserved for people of high rank, such as politicians and the wealthy class. As a result, dignity was not for all human persons but only for people of high rank. Also, like other scholars, such as Korsgaard, Kant maintains that dignity is an inherent worth of humans by virtue of being rational and autonomous beings. Dignity, as conceived in this sense, cannot be forfeited. This is contrary to achievement dignity, which attributes dignity to a human person because of their achievements and social status. In the latter case, the loss concerns attributed status or reputation rather than intrinsic moral worth. The widespread use of the concept does not eliminate the differences between its philosophical meanings. These differences matter because attributed status, virtuous conduct, and intrinsic worth generate distinct grounds for recognition. However, the Kantian approach to the discourse of human dignity is significant for the present study, which aims to extend the principles of governance in Africa to include respect for human dignity.

The application of Kantian ethics to governance in Africa requires engagement with African philosophical accounts of human dignity. This methodological requirement is consistent with the project of conceptual decolonisation associated with scholars such as Kwasi Wiredu. Here conceptual decolonisation means critically examining inherited conceptual assumptions and assessing their suitability for African languages, experiences, and philosophical frameworks. It does not require the indiscriminate rejection of ideas because of their geographical origin. Applying Kantian respect for dignity to governance in Africa therefore requires a dialogue with African conceptions of human worth, rather than the uncritical superimposition of an external moral framework. The purpose is to identify possible areas of convergence and significant differences, rather than assume that a single African perspective exists or that it coincides completely with Kant's account. To develop this comparison, the analysis focuses on Thaddeus Metz's relational theory while recognising that it represents one contribution to a plural philosophical field. Before examining Metz's approach, it is useful to distinguish three broad strands within African philosophical discussions of dignity. These categories organise the discussion without suggesting that every thinker within a category adopts an identical position. The first is a vitality-based conception of dignity. This approach maintains that humans have dignity by virtue of exhibiting and possessing a spiritual life force emanating from God [Bujo, 1997; Iroegbu, 2005; Molefe, 2014]. The second approach is the personhood theory of human dignity. Here, humans are said to have dignity because they have the capacity to lead a morally virtuous life [Menkiti, 1984; Gyekye, 1992; Murove, 2016; Ikuenobe, 2016, 2018]. The third approach is the communal theory of human dignity. This approach generally understands human dignity to mean the capacity to identify and relate communally [Metz, 2010:81-99; 2023:23-42]. The third approach provides the principal basis for the comparison developed here. Metz advances a secular account of human dignity. The central claim of his account is that beings possess varied capacities to commune and relate communally, while humans possess a higher degree of capacity to relate and commune than other beings [Metz, 2023, p. 25]. This provides the basis for Metz's relational theory of human dignity [Metz, 2010, 2012; 2023]. Metz identifies two essential, distinct properties to relate communally: identification with others and solidarity towards others [Molefe 2022, p. 26]. According to him, human dignity is demonstrated in terms of human ability to engage in harmonious social relationships with others. As earlier noted, this fundamentally distinguishes humans from animals, plants, and other non-living entities in the world. Metz explains the capacity to identify with others and exhibit solidarity towards others as follows: To share a way of life means that one enjoys a sense of togetherness with another individual, avoids frustrating her ends, and instead coordinates with her to help achieve them. To care for another's quality of life means that one meets her needs, which might be biological, psychological, or social, avoids causing harm, and does these things typically out of sympathy and for her sake, not one's own long-term self-interest [2023:26].

In the account examined here, Metz connects dignity with the capacity to be both a subject and an object of communal relationships. The distinction concerns the ability to relate to others and the ability to be related to by others. To be a subject of relations implies that one has the capacity to commune with others, engage in activities that strengthen their friendship, advance and promote the ends of others, and participate in activities that improve their quality of life and express recognition of their moral worth. Being an object of social relationships means that others can enter into a communal relationship with that person [Metz, 2023:26]. That is, in the same way one can participate in the ends of others as a subject of social relationships, others can also participate in one's end, care for one's needs, and engage in activities that advance one's good. Nonetheless, this capacity could be temporarily suspended by circumstances that obstruct participation in social relationships. Temporary vulnerability illustrates this distinction. Consider a person whose capacity to participate actively in communal relationships is severely impaired by intoxication. In that condition, the person may remain an object of communal care while being temporarily unable to act effectively as its subject: others can care for the person, although the person cannot presently reciprocate or participate in the usual way. However, Metz maintains that dignity is not lost when one is in a state of vulnerability because one still retains the ability to commune and be communed with when they are sober [2023:28]. Metz also considers infants and people with profound cognitive impairments. His account distinguishes the grounds of dignity in its specific technical sense from the grounds of a very high moral status. Where the capacity for active communal participation is absent or substantially limited, the person can still be an object of communal concern: others can share aspects of life with them, respond to their needs, offer care, and sustain meaningful relationships. This argument should not be taken to imply that every person with a mental disability lacks the capacity to love, care, or participate in communal life. By implication, Metz remarks that "it could be a grave wrong to mistreat a severely mentally disabled human being or a human baby, even if the wrongness would not consist of degrading their dignity" [2023:29].

The comparison between Metz's communal approach and Kant's account reveals important ethical convergences alongside different foundations. Metz grounds dignity in capacities for communal relationships, whereas Kant grounds it in rational nature and autonomy. Both approaches nevertheless support concern for others' permissible ends and oppose the subordination of persons to purely self-interested purposes. Identification and solidarity are explicit features of Metz's account; in Kant's framework, related practical obligations emerge through respect for humanity and duties of beneficence. Kant gives a distinct normative formulation to this concern by requiring that others be treated as ends in themselves and never merely as means to additional purposes. In the same vein, neither approach treats freedom or communal capacity as a permission to harm others without moral constraint. Metz agrees with the Kantian approach to human dignity that: If a person misuses his capacity for freedom, it is not degraded if we restrict it to protect the freedom of others… coercion and other uncooperative

behavior can be justified, despite grounding dignity in our capacity to cooperate and otherwise relate communally, because if a person misuses his capacity to commune, it is not degraded if we restrict it to protect others' capacity to be subjects and objects of communal relations [2023:30].

The comparison therefore supports a limited convergence in practical obligations rather than an identity between the two theories. Kant emphasises rational autonomy and moral self-legislation; Metz emphasises capacities for identification, solidarity, and communal relationships. The distinction between possessing moral standing and expressing it through action is particularly important. In Kant's account, cultivating the strength of will to act from duty is a requirement of virtue, not a process through which previously undignified persons acquire intrinsic worth. In Metz's account, the capacity to commune and be communed with provides the relevant relational foundation. Loving and being loved, caring and being cared for, and supporting others' legitimate purposes illustrate its practical expression. Together, these perspectives make it possible to articulate a framework of governance that connects respect for agency with responsibility for the social conditions of human flourishing.

Governance refers here to the processes through which public authorities and institutions manage resources, formulate and implement policies, and provide services necessary for people's well-being and social life. From the normative perspective adopted in this discussion, governance should protect people's interests and improve their conditions of life. Government exists to serve the public rather than to subordinate the public to the private purposes of office-holders. This position is supported by the argument that governmental authority derives from the people (Oyeshile, 2014:88). Government and citizens therefore stand in a relationship of public responsibility and reciprocal obligations. Government consequently bears a primary responsibility to safeguard rights and establish conditions in which people can flourish. This responsibility does not exclude the complementary contributions of communities, civil society, and other social institutions. Olatunji Oyeshile supports this position by arguing that the state is necessary for the actualisation of an individual's goals and aspirations [2014:89].

The central question is how respect for human dignity can function as a viable normative principle of governance in African contexts. The problems considered here include poor leadership, corruption, economic stagnation, political instability, inequality, injustice, restrictions on individual freedom, limited public participation, and constraints on a free press. These problems vary across countries and periods; their discussion does not justify treating Africa as a uniform political space. Where authoritarian practices and regressive policies occur, they undermine the institutional recognition of dignity and the effective exercise of autonomy. Such treatment violates the claims associated with intrinsic worth without extinguishing that worth. These failures also weaken the conditions of development. Amartya Sen's emphasis on substantive individual freedom provides a relevant perspective on this relationship. As cited in the source used here, Sen explains: First, in the normative approach used here, substantive individual

freedom is taken to be crucial. The success of a society is to be evaluated, in this view, primarily by the substantive freedoms that members of that society enjoy… The second reason for taking substantive freedom to be crucial is that freedom is not only the basis of the evaluation of success and failure, but it is also a principal determinant of individual initiative and social effectiveness [2018:165]. The argument is that economic or administrative gains alone do not constitute development in the substantive sense when individuals' freedom and agency remain unrecognised or unprotected. For Sen, freedom is an integral attribute of development. Development, understood in this way, concerns the expansion of people's real opportunities to pursue valuable ways of life. Freedom is not only the absence of restraint, but also the attainment of the actualisation of an individual's goal and the creation of those conditions under which the pursuit of an individual's goal is realisable. Although the state needs to recognise and respect individuals' freedom, individuals can be restricted in the interests of the overall good of the state and society [Oyeshile, 2014:89]. Within a Kantian framework, constraints on wrongful action can be justified when they protect the compatible freedom of others. This does not grant public authorities an unrestricted permission to coerce: the ethical justification depends on protecting equal freedom rather than securing the convenience or private interests of rulers.

The protection and safeguarding of human freedom are ensured not only through recognising fundamental human rights but also by shielding these rights from encroachment and unwarranted abuse. Protecting human rights acts as a check on the excesses of the state. In the present account of governance, human rights provide an institutional expression of the protection owed to human freedom. The protection and promotion of human rights stand as one of the core principles of a democratic society. Human rights guarantee citizens' free participation in governance and decision-making on matters that concern them. People should be free, without fear, to offer constructive criticism of the state's policies and to express their opinions on issues that threaten their lives. However, in some African states, expressions of public views on policies that threaten lives are obstructed through informational exclusion, censorship, and the suppression of political opposition and the mass media. Where such practices occur, they weaken public accountability and create conditions in which people find it increasingly difficult to pursue their goals or influence decisions that affect their lives. When people cannot express their views on policies affecting them, public institutions lose an important source of information, criticism, and correction. This exclusion makes it harder for governance to respond to the needs and interests of the population. The consequence is that these conflicting realities between the people's demands and government interests undermine the public recognition of people's worth and their ability to exercise agency. Such practices fail to show the respect owed to persons, even though their intrinsic dignity remains unchanged. Such exclusion also indicates that public authorities prioritise the opinions and interests of a few over the common good. One way to resolve this impasse is for the government to promote and ensure popular participation and to allow for

constructive criticism and opposition. This approach would subject policies and public decisions to deliberation and scrutiny, reducing the scope for arbitrary imposition. Such practices would give institutional expression to respect for the people's autonomy for self-determination and freedom of expression, which includes allowing space for public dissent. Political deception provides a further illustration of instrumental treatment. Where officials manipulate voters to gain office and then disregard commitments knowingly made without an intention to fulfil them, citizens are treated as instruments of political success. This argument concerns deliberate deception rather than every failure to implement an electoral promise, since changing circumstances may also affect policy delivery. Christopher Agulanna offers a critical diagnosis of political immorality when he states that "a defining feature of African life appears to be the enthronement of political immorality as a social norm among the people." [Christopher Agulanna, 2014:9]. The acceptance of deception as a normal instrument of political success can be compared with an instrumental reading of Niccolò Machiavelli's discussion of princely rule. The familiar expression "the ends justify the means" summarises this reading; it is an interpretive formula rather than a verbatim quotation from the passage cited below. In The Prince, Machiavelli argues that a ruler may need to depart from conventional virtue to preserve political authority. Deception, manipulation, and coercion may therefore appear defensible when their purpose is the survival of the ruler or the maintenance of the political order. This orientation is often discussed in relation to the later vocabulary of ragione di stato. The relevant passage states: … a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous. Therefore, if a prince wants to maintain his rule, he must be prepared not to be virtuous, and to make use of this or not according to need [Machiavelli, 1999, Chap. XV:50]. When this instrumental reading becomes a model of governance, preserving the office-holder's power can take priority over the interests and standing of citizens. People are then treated as resources to be mobilised, manipulated, or disregarded according to their usefulness to those in authority. This is a criticism of a ruler-centred political practice, rather than an exhaustive account of Machiavelli's political philosophy. Politics organised in this way subordinates the common good to the survival and advancement of those who hold power. The worth and dignity of the people are only seemingly respected during elections, when leaders acknowledge their social and political importance and value their participation. It is therefore implied that the people are merely used as means to other ends, not as ends in themselves. Where these practices occur in African political contexts, leaders disregard citizens' agency and expose them to oppression or mistreatment. A dignity-oriented approach instead requires public authorities to recognise citizens as persons whose claims matter independently of their electoral or political usefulness. Ethical legitimacy therefore depends on governance that serves the public and rejects the reduction of persons to instruments of the state. This approach requires people's interests and voices to be considered in social and political planning, together with equitable access to the institutions and services

through which their rights become effective. Such measures strengthen the social and institutional recognition of dignity and support conditions for a better quality of life. An administration's ethical legitimacy is weakened when degrading practices and abuses of authority undermine individuals and the institutions intended to represent their aspirations. In fact, the potential of individuals is most fully realised in a society that values each person and creates an environment conducive to growth and prosperity. Achieving this depends on government structures and institutions aligning with individual interests, alongside mechanisms to protect basic human rights and provide opportunities for all to flourish and lead meaningful lives. The results of this conceptual and normative analysis can be articulated at three connected levels. First, distinguishing intrinsic worth from attributed status and virtuous conduct prevents governance from making respect conditional on wealth, political loyalty, public usefulness, or personal achievement. Second, the comparison between Kant and Metz identifies a practical convergence: institutions should respect agency while also supporting relationships of care, solidarity, and mutual concern. This convergence does not erase their different accounts of the foundation of dignity, particularly the questions raised by infancy and impaired capacities. Third, applying these insights to governance provides a standard for evaluating political conduct independently of an office-holder's success in retaining power.

Within the framework developed here, respect for human dignity therefore requires more than respectful language or formal recognition. It calls for opportunities for public participation, institutions responsive to criticism, safeguards against degrading treatment, and the responsible use of resources intended for public well-being. These requirements connect the prohibition of treating persons merely as means with positive attention to the conditions under which they can pursue meaningful lives. The central result is a philosophical justification for assessing governance by its treatment of persons and its support for their agency and flourishing. It is a normative conclusion derived from the arguments discussed above, rather than an empirical claim that adopting the framework has already produced measurable changes across African states.

CONCLUSION

In concluding this essay, human dignity encompassing freedom, autonomy, and moral virtues constitutes a fundamental principle of governance that African leaders must uphold to achieve genuine legitimacy. Legitimacy extends beyond electoral victory; while elections may be won through political manipulation, enduring acceptance and recognition require the establishment of political structures and institutions that protect human dignity, fundamental rights, and foster an environment conducive to individual flourishing. Failure to do so constitutes a denigration of human dignity, resulting in the neglect and instrumentalisation of citizens, who are then deprived of basic rights and meaningful participation in political decision-making. Such conditions undermine good governance and impede development. In accordance with Kant's categorical

imperative, political leaders are urged to act according to maxims that can be universalised. Adherence to this moral law ensures that leaders not only fulfil their promises but also treat individuals as ends in themselves.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1.Agulanna, C. (2014). Moral and Political Education as Foundation for a Reasonable Social Order in Africa. In F. A. Adeigbo, Dipo Irele & Amaechi Udefi (Eds.), Ethics and Public Affairs, Ibadan University Press, 1-14.

2.Allosbrook, C. J. (2023). African recognition of dignity as a basis for universal human rights. Acta Academica, 55(1), 20-40. https://doi.org/10.38140/aa.v55i1.7268.

3.Benezet, B. (1997). The ethical dimension of community. C. N. Nganda (Trans.). Paulines Publications.

4.Donnelly, J. (2015). Normative versus Taxonomic Humanity: Varieties of Human Dignity in the Western Tradition. Journal of Human Rights, 14, 1-22.

5.Formosa, P. (2017). Kantian Ethics, Dignity and Perfection. Cambridge University Press.

6.Gyekye, K. (1992). Person and Community in African Thought. In K. Wiredu and K. Gyekye (Eds.), Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, vol. 1, Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 101-124.

7.Habermas, J. (2010). The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human Rights. Metaphilosophy, 41(4), 464–480, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2010.01648.x.

8.Hughes, G. (2011). The concept of dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Journal of Religious Ethics, 39(1), 1–24, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9795.2010.00463.x.

9.Ikuenobe, P. (2016). The communal basis for moral dignity: An African perspective. Philosophical Papers, 45(3), 437-469. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2016.1245833.

10.Ikuenobe, P. (2018). Human rights, personhood, dignity, and African communalism. Journal of Human Rights, 17, 589-604.

11.Iroegbu, P. (2005). Right to life and the means to life: Human dignity. In Pantaleon Iroegbu & A. Echekwube (Eds.), Kpim of morality ethics. Heinemann Educational Books.

12.Kant, I. (2004). Ethics is Based on Reason. In Harry J. Gensler, Earl W. Spurgin, and James C. (Eds.), Ethics: Contemporary Readings. Swindal. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group.

13.Kant, I. (1785/2001). Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Thomas K. Abbott. Random House, Inc.

14.Korsgaard, C. (1983). Two Distinctions in Goodness. Philosophical Review, 92(2), 169-195.

15.Kumar, A. (2021). Kant on the Ground of Human Dignity. Kantian Review, 26(3), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1369415420000588

16.Machiavelli, N. (1999). The Prince. Chap. XV. Translated with notes by

George Bull. Penguin Books.

17.Malphas, J. & Norelle, L. (2007). Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation. Springer.

18.Menkiti, I. (1984). Person and community in African traditional thought. In Richard Wright (Ed.), African Philosophy: An Introduction. University Press of America.

19.Metz, T. (2010). Human dignity, capital punishment, and an African moral theory. Journal of Human Rights, 9, 81-99.

20.Metz, T. (2012). African conceptions of human dignity: Vitality and community as ground of human rights. Human Rights Review, 13, 19-37.

21.Metz, T. (2023). Defending a Communal Account of Human Dignity. In M. Molefe & C. Allsobrook (Eds.), Human Dignity in an African Context. Palgrave Macmillan.

22.Molefe, M. (2024). Africa, Black, and Western Conceptions of Human Dignity. The Monist, 107, 239. https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onae011.

23.Molefe, M. (2014). Critical reflections on Gyeye's humanism: Defending supernaturalism. In E. Imafidon & J.A.I. Bewaji (Eds.), Ontologized Ethics. Lexington Books.

24.Molefe, M. (2022). Human Dignity in African Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. Springer.

25.Murove, M. F. (2016). African moral consciousness. Austin Macauley Publishers Ltd.

26. Oduwole, E. O. & Fayemi, A. K. (2022). Human Dignity in Yoruba Worldview. NAJOP: Nasara Journal of Philosophy, 7(1), 1-18.

27.Offor, F. (2014). Social Justice, Democracy and the Crisis of Development in Africa. In F. A. Adeigbo, Dipo Irele, & Amaechi Udefi (Eds.), Ethics and Public Affairs. Ibadan University Press, 93-103.

28.Olatunji, F. O. (2018). Modernisation Theory and the Challenge of Social Order in Africa. In Zalaznik, Mira & Komel. Peter Lang AG (Eds.), Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit als Herausforderung der Humanwissenschaften - Freedom and Justice as a Challenge of the Humanities, International Academic Publishers.

29.Omoregbe, J. (2011). Comparative Philosophy East and West: A Comparative Analysis of Asian and Western Philosophies. Joja Educational Research and Publishers Limited.

30.Oyeshile, O. A. (2014). Respect for Persons as a Principle of Governance. In F. A. Adeigbo, Dipo Irele, and Amaechi Udefi (Eds.), Ethics and Public Affairs. Ibadan University Press.

31.Rawls, J. (1993). The Law of Peoples. Harvard University Press.

32.Rodriquez, P-A. (2015). Human Dignity as an Essentially Contested Concept. Cambridge Review International Affairs, 28(4), 743-756.

33.Rosen, M. (2012). Dignity: Its History and Meaning. Harvard University Press.

34.Sinha, N. (2020). Human Dignity – A Kantian Perspective. Interwoven: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Navrachana University 3(2), 15-24.

35.Sulmasy, D. P. (2008). Dignity and Bioethics: History, Theory, and Selected Applications. The President's Council on Bioethics, Human Dignity and Bioethics Essays Commissioned by the President's Council. President's Council on Bioethics.

36.Taylor, C. (1992). The Politics of Recognition. Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition. Princeton University Press.

37.Ujomu, O. P. (2019), Human Dignity and Social Order as Key Values for an Endogenous African Development. AGATHOS, 10(2), 267-281.

Соломон Колаволе Аве
государственный университет Осун, Осогбо,
Колледж гуманитарных наук и культуры,
факультет культуры,
кампус Икире
ORCID: 0000-0001-5959-9052
e-mail: solomon.awe@uniosun.edu.ng
(штат Осун, Нигерия)

Олувасеун Опейеми Джемилехин
Государственный университет Осун, Осогбо,
Колледж гуманитарных наук и культуры,
факультет культуры,
кампус Икире,
e-mail: oluwaseun.jemilehin@uniosun.edu.ng
(штат Осун, Нигерия)

КАНТОВСКОЕ УВАЖЕНИЕ ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКОГО ДОСТОИНСТВА КАК ПРИНЦИП УПРАВЛЕНИЯ В СОВРЕМЕННОЙ АФРИКЕ

Аннотация. Человеческое достоинство выступает нравственным основанием прав человека и принципом государственного управления, ориентированного на защиту личности и обеспечение условий достойной жизни. Кантовское понимание достоинства как безусловной внутренней ценности личности, связанной с разумностью, свободой и автономией, позволяет обосновать ответственность власти перед человеком и недопустимость его использования исключительно как средства достижения политических целей. Вместе с тем нарушения прав человека, коррупция и злоупотребление властью в ряде африканских стран препятствуют реализации этого принципа и ограничивают возможности достойного существования людей. В связи с этим цель статьи заключается в раскрытии философского содержания кантовской концепции человеческого достоинства с применением критического и аналитического методов и обосновании ее значения для переориентации государственного управления в современной Африке на уважение личности, защиту ее прав и повышение качества жизни.

Ключевые слова: человеческое достоинство, автономия, свобода, рациональность, Иммануил Кант.

Solomon Kolavole Ave
Osun davlat universiteti, Osogbo,
Gumanitar fanlar va madaniyat kolleji,
Madaniyat fakulteti,
Ikire kampusi,
ORCID: 0000-0001-5959-9052
e-mail: solomon.awe@uniosun.edu.ng
(Osun shtati, Nigeriya)

Oluvaseun Opeyemi Jemilehin
Osun davlat universiteti, Osogbo,
Gumanitar fanlar va madaniyat kolleji,
Madaniyat fakulteti,
Ikire kampusi,
(Osun shtati, Nigeriya)
e-mail: oluwaseun.jemilehin@uniosun.edu.ng

KANT FALSAFASIDA INSON QADR-QIMMATIGA HURMAT ZAMONAVIY AFRIKADA DAVLAT BOSHQARUVI TAMOYILI SIFATIDA

Annotatsiya. Inson qadr-qimmati inson huquqlarining axloqiy asosi hamda shaxsni himoya qilish va munosib hayot sharoitlarini ta’minlashga yo‘naltirilgan davlat boshqaruvining muhim tamoyilidir. Kantning qadr-qimmatni shaxsning aql, erkinlik va avtonomiyaga asoslangan shartsiz ichki qadriyati sifatida talqin qilishi davlat hokimiyatining inson oldidagi mas’uliyatini hamda undan siyosiy maqsadlarga erishishning shunchaki vositasi sifatida foydalanishga yo‘l qo‘yib bo‘lmasligini asoslash imkonini beradi. Biroq Afrikaning ayrim mamlakatlarida inson huquqlarining buzilishi, korrupsiya va hokimiyat vakolatlarining suiiste’mol qilinishi ushbu tamoyilning ro‘yobga chiqishiga to‘sqinlik qilib, insonlarning munosib yashash imkoniyatlarini cheklaydi. Shu munosabat bilan maqolaning maqsadi tanqidiy va tahliliy usullar yordamida Kantning inson qadr-qimmati konsepsiyasining falsafiy mazmunini ochib berish hamda zamonaviy Afrikada davlat boshqaruvini shaxsga hurmat, uning huquqlarini himoya qilish va hayot sifatini yaxshilashga yo‘naltirishdagi ahamiyatini asoslashdan iborat.

Kalit so‘zlar: inson qadr-qimmati, avtonomiya, erkinlik, ratsionallik, Immanuil Kant.